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Executive Summary 
 
The increasing centrality of the Internet in modern communications, together with 
massive changes in the landscape of the telecommunications market, have intensified the calls 
for Congress to overhaul the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  In this paper, we analyze this 
looming legislative challenge by dividing it into two sets of issues:  first, issues concerning the 
proper  substance  of telecommunications policy reform; and, second, issues concerning the 
appropriate institutions for carrying out that reform.  In Part I, we argue that Congress should 
require regulators to adhere more closely to (and justify departures from) basic antitrust 
principles in developing the substance of competition policy.  In particular, we explore how 
those principles would have brought greater predictability and analytical rigor to the FCC’s 
implementation of statutory provisions requiring incumbent telephone providers to lease parts of 
their networks to competitors.  Moreover, we explain how antitrust principles can now inform 
the current debate over whether to regulate broadband platforms to prevent discrimination 
against independent providers of applications like voice over Internet protocol. 
 
In Part II, we turn to Congress’s institutional choices in reforming telecommunications 
regulation.  Despite our advocacy for antitrust-oriented rules of decision, we argue for a 
continued reliance on the FCC, rather than antitrust courts, as the appropriate institution for 
superintending the efficient development of competition throughout the industry.  Not only does 
the FCC enjoy specialized expertise in the economics and technology of the telecommunications 
industry, it also enjoys a distinct advantage over courts in developing and enforcing 
complicated—and necessary—prescriptive rules, such as those governing interconnection and its 
associated intercarrier fees.  At the same time, the FCC will increasingly need to refocus its 
energies from prescriptive  regulation to a new emphasis on after-the-fact enforcement and 
market-monitoring, much like the role played today by the Federal Trade Commission.   1
First Principles for an Effective Rewrite of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
 




Nine years ago, no praise was considered too extravagant for the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, the newly enacted legislation designed to stimulate greater competition in 
telecommunications markets.  Larry Pressler, the chief Senate sponsor, called the Act’s passage 
“a Camelot moment” of high politics that had stilled the industry’s “greedy, squabbling 
interests.”
1  Building on the metaphor, FCC Commissioner Rachelle Chong ventured that, as 
with “King Arthur’s knights of the Round Table, there is a feeling in the communications 
community that we are all embarking on a great and momentous adventure together” to “a world 
of fierce, but chivalrous competition.”
2  Turning from chivalric to cosmological imagery, she 
added that “the sun, the moon, and the stars all seemed to line up on the afternoon of February 
1
st,” when the Act was passed. 
After a few days, however, astute observers noticed that the Act didn’t quite line up after 
all.  The Act was susceptible to as many competing interpretations as a Rorshach test, and each 
industry actor could interpret it as a boon for its own interests.  As Justice Antonin Scalia 
observed for the Supreme Court three years later, “It would be gross understatement to say that 
the 1996 Act is not a model of clarity.  It is in many important respects a model of ambiguity or 
indeed even self-contradiction.  That is most unfortunate for a piece of legislation that 
profoundly affects a crucial segment of the economy worth tens of billions of dollars.”
3   
To savvy political observers, the Act’s radical indeterminacy came as no surprise.  The 
legislation was written not so much by Congress as by warring interest groups that believed they 
were playing a zero-sum game.  In these circumstances, it is always easier for a legislator to vote 
for an ambiguous provision—thereby punting hard issues to regulators and the courts—than to 
vote for a provision that decides important controversies clearly and directly.  The latter course, 
                                                 
1 Mike Mills, A “Camelot Moment” on Communications, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1996, at H1. 
2 Remarks of Commissioner Rachelle B. Chong Before the Federal Communications Bar Ass’n, Midwest Chapter, 
“A Camelot Moment—the Telecommunications Act of 1996,” Feb. 16, 1996 
 (http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Chong/sprbc603.txt). 
3 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999).   2
while better for industry stability and the public interest, is sure to alienate one powerful interest 
group or another.  Ambiguity, by contrast, enables politicians to waffle about what they really 
meant when they cast their votes, and to blame someone else if their votes are later construed by 
a court or agency against the interests of a particular constituency.  
The Act’s origins in interest group politics thus explain why the task of interpreting a 
given provision often seems like a law school moot court problem.  In particular, the Act allows 
opposing legal positions to coexist in such perfect equipoise that no side enjoys any inherent 
advantage over the others and each side can litigate decisions with which it disagrees in a state of 
almost perfect interpretive competition.  Congress addressed some issues with language that 
superficially appears specific and definitive but, on closer inspection, turns out to be riddled with 
ambiguities.
4  As a result, such basic questions as the FCC’s institutional role in the new 
regulatory framework remained unresolved for years while courts disagreed about what, if 
anything, Congress might have had in mind.
5  Perhaps ambiguity is an inevitable by-product of 
legislation in an industry filled with potent and mutually antagonistic lobbying forces.  But 
ambiguity carries staggering costs.  Particularly in an industry as fast-moving as this one, 
regulatory uncertainty has taken a toll on investment incentives, and has given rise to an industry 
as focused on litigation and lobbying sound-bites as on the production of economic value for 
consumers.   
The problem with 1996 Act, moreover, is not just that it hedges on the topics it addresses, 
but that it fails to address the central telecommunications policy challenge of our time:  how to 
rationalize the regulatory treatment of different communications platforms in an age of radical 
technological convergence.  American communications law has developed over the decades on 
the premise that a given transmission platform (such as a cable or telephone network) will be 
used to provide a discrete set of services that will not be provided over other transmission 
platforms.  The law has thus subjected different platforms to divergent schemes of regulation:  
telephone companies, for example, are regulated as common carriers, while cable companies 
                                                 
4 This problem, curiously enough, seems to have eluded the legislation’s main congressional sponsors.  Senator 
Pressler, for example, maintained that the FCC’s implementation tasks were straightforward because “Congress has 
already done the heavy lifting when it comes to policy choices in telecommunications reform.”  A New FCC Dawns 
in the Wake of the Telecom Act, FCC REPORTS, 1996 WL 8542600 (June 19, 1996) (quoting Sen. Larry Pressler). 
5 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).   3
generally are not, when the two types of companies are providing competing services, such as 
high-speed data links.
6   
In 1996, Congress did little to eliminate this “silo”-oriented regulatory structure because 
it did not foresee that broadband Internet access over disparate types of transmission networks 
would emerge as the medium of the future for most communications services, including voice, 
data, and video.  Consequently, many regulators today spend less time thinking about the core 
economics of broadband policy than about legal questions of scholastic complexity concerning 
whether a particular company’s IP-based service
7 should be regulated as a Title II 
“telecommunications service,” as a Title I “information service,” as a Title VI “cable service,” or 
something else altogether.  These are questions of interest only to lawyers, not to economists or 
network engineers—a key sign that they are precisely the wrong questions to be asking. 
As we approach the Act’s tenth anniversary, the criticisms leveled at it, and the calls to 
rewrite it, have both grown louder.  Some in the industry and on Capitol Hill have already begun 
speaking of a “Telecom Act of 2005,” even though no comprehensive legislation has yet been 
drafted.
8  While the odds of broad reform this year are slim, this is a time of keen interest in the 
law governing competition in the telecommunications industry, and sweeping congressional 
action is likely within the next several years.  This paper analyzes this looming legislative 
challenge by dividing it into two sets of issues:  first, issues concerning the proper substance of 
telecommunications policy reform; and, second, issues concerning the appropriate institutions for 
carrying out that reform.   
In Part I, we argue that, when it sets about to rewrite telecommunications law, Congress 
should require the FCC to adhere more closely to (and justify departures from) basic antitrust 
principles in developing the substance of its competition policy.  Although other commentators 
have proposed an antitrust model for this industry, they have tended to focus less on 
incorporating the substance of antitrust doctrine within prescriptive telecommunications 
regulation than on eliminating such regulation altogether in favor of antitrust enforcement by 
                                                 
6 See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd 4798 (2002). 
7 As we use it here, the term “IP-based service” describes the full range of applications that can be provided over the 
Internet protocol, whether over the public Internet or a private (“managed”) IP network. 
8  See, e.g., F. Duane Ackerman, The Telecommunications Act of 2005 (December 14, 2004) 
(http://www.aei.org/news/newsID.21712/news_detail.asp).   4
generalist courts.
9  Our purpose here is to decouple the substantive component of this inquiry 
from the institutional, and to probe more deeply into the full implications of substantive antitrust 
analysis for regulation of this increasingly IP-based industry.   
We begin with a brief autopsy of the FCC’s regime for implementing the 1996 Act’s 
network-sharing mandates.  As we explain, the FCC might have avoided nine years of regulatory 
uncertainty had it given greater attention to the factors that inform antitrust analysis, including 
the concern that excessive regulatory intervention can impose immense enforcement costs, 
distort markets, and chill investment.  We then turn to the complex competition issues presented 
by the rise of broadband platforms, whether over cable modem technology, DSL, wireless 
spectrum, or some other medium.  Here, too, antitrust holds critical lessons for policymakers.  
The most important of these is that policymakers should look beyond legacy regulatory 
classifications to the emerging market structure for communications-related services, in which all 
types of traditional communications “services” can ride as higher-layer applications on top of 
any IP-based broadband platform.   
As discussed below, commentators disagree about the extent to which policymakers 
should reorient telecommunications policy to reflect the layered characteristics of this new 
market structure.  Contrary to what many commentators appear to believe, accounting for those 
characteristics would not invite heavy-handed regulation of last-mile transmission providers to 
preclude discrimination against applications and content providers.  As the FCC itself has 
recognized, competition in the platform market vastly diminishes a platform provider’s ability to 
engage in such discrimination.  A subtler dynamic known as the “internalization of 
complementary externalities”—more familiar to antitrust practitioners than to regulators—
likewise tends to reduce a platform provider’s incentives to practice such discrimination.  In 
particular, even a hypothetical monopolist in a platform market, such as the market for physical-
layer transmission services, may have little incentive to thwart competition in adjacent markets, 
such as the various markets for higher-layer applications, if it is free of price constraints in the 
platform market and does not perceive any threat by the applications providers to its underlying 
platform monopoly.  This insight, which the FCC has yet to incorporate into its thinking, draws 
further into question whether prescriptive regulatory schemes such as the Computer Inquiry rules 
                                                 
9 Peter Huber, Law and Disorder in Cyberspace:  Abolish the FCC and Let Common Law Rule the Telecosm (1997).   5
remain necessary to protect information service providers against monopoly leveraging by the 
owners of transmission networks.
10 
In Part II, we turn from these substantive issues to Congress’s institutional choices in 
reforming telecommunications regulation.  As noted, reliance on antitrust principles as the 
substantive rules of decision would not necessarily warrant reliance on antitrust courts, rather 
than regulatory agencies such as the FCC, as the appropriate institutions for superintending the 
efficient development of competition throughout the industry.  To the contrary, the FCC, despite 
its well-known flaws, will remain better suited than antitrust courts for that role.  That is so not 
just because the FCC has far greater institutional expertise than generalist courts in this unusually 
technical area, but also because prescriptive rulemaking—the province of agencies—is essential 
for much-needed predictability on such complex industry-wide issues as intercarrier 
compensation for traffic crossing different networks.  At the same time, however, the FCC 
should gradually refocus its energies from comprehensive ex ante regulation to a more 
enforcement-oriented market-monitoring role, much like the FTC’s.
11 
 
1. An Antitrust Perspective on Network Access Obligations 
 
One of the basic questions that has preoccupied telecommunications policymakers for the 
past ten years is when it makes economic sense to force vertically integrated network owners—
such as local telephone companies or cable companies—to share their networks with unaffiliated 
firms for the provision of potentially competing services.  At the highest level of generality, such 
sharing obligations can take one of two related but distinct forms:  duties to lease network 
facilities on regulated terms to unaffiliated telecommunications carriers, and duties to offer 
services on regulated terms to unaffiliated firms of all sorts, including information service 
providers.  The first set of obligations, which we briefly address in Part I(A), is designed 
primarily to promote competition within the physical-layer market for transmission services.   
The second, which we address in Part I(B), is designed in part to protect higher-layer (and 
                                                 
10 See Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies:  Towards a 
Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. TECH. 85, 105-19 (2003); Philip J. 
Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 41, 65-84 (2003). 
11 Our evaluation of the FCC’s role and purpose focuses on the economic efficiency justifications for regulation.  We 
do not, for example, evaluate whether the FCC is the appropriate agency to address equity concerns related to   6
downstream) information service providers from discrimination by vertically integrated 
providers of physical-layer transmission inputs.  In discussing both sets of issues, we explain 
how we believe the relevant policy debates should be framed.  We have not, however, evaluated 
existing empirical analyses concerning the merits of given regulatory strategies.  In that respect, 




In the 1996 Act, Congress imposed facilities-leasing obligations on incumbent local 
telephone companies, and them alone, on the ground that they dominated the market for point-to-
point wireline communications.  Congress purported to define the scope of those leasing 
obligations by enacting the “impairment” provision of section 251(d)(2).  That provision directs 
the FCC to limit physical leasing rights to network elements whose unavailability would 
“impair” a competing carrier’s ability to offer telecommunications services.
12  O n  c l o s e  
inspection, this provision—like so many others in the Act—is an empty vessel.  Did Congress 
mean to constrain leasing rights to network elements that would be considered “essential 
facilities” for purposes of antitrust law?
13  That interpretation, if adopted, arguably would have 
confined such rights mostly to mass market loops (the traditionally copper-based telephone lines 
connecting switches to individual homes and small businesses).  Or, by avoiding “essential 
facilities” terminology, did Congress signal that it wished to extend such leasing rights much 
                                                                                                                                                             
affordable telephone service or social policy concerns such as ensuring that communications networks can be 
subject to wiretaps by law enforcement authorities. 
12 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2). 
13 Under the “essential facilities doctrine” adopted by some federal courts of appeals, a monopolist must sometimes 
cooperate with their rivals’ market entry plans by selling them access to bottleneck facilities with “natural 
monopoly” characteristics.  In the telecommunications field, the essential facilities doctrine is best known for its 
application in MCI’s private antitrust case against AT&T in the 1970s and early 1980s. In that case, the Seventh 
Circuit ruled that a competitor states a claim under the essential facilities doctrine where (1) a monopolist exercises 
control of an essential facility; (2) a competitor cannot practically or reasonably duplicate the facility; (3) the 
monopolist has denied the competitor access to the facility; and (4) the monopolist can feasibly provide access to the 
facility. MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Aspen Skiing Co. 
v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596 n.19 (1985) (acknowledging that antitrust laws prevent 
competitors from “exclud[ing] rivals on some basis other than efficiency.”); Otter Tail v. United States, 410 U.S. 
366, 380 (1973) (mandating cooperation from an incumbent electric utility to facilitate entry).  As discussed in Part 
II, the Supreme Court has never endorsed the essential facilities doctrine, and some have criticized it on the ground 
that it inappropriately involves antitrust courts in highly technical issues concerning the management of access to 
monopoly facilities. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet In Need of Limiting Principles, 58 
ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1989).    7
more broadly?  Congress did not say, and the legacy of its ambiguity has been years of 
regulatory chaos.   
For almost a decade after the Act’s passage, the FCC, unbound by any clear 
congressional policy choice, either downplayed or simply ignored core antitrust insights in 
deciding what elements of the incumbents’ local networks should be subject to compulsory 
leasing arrangements.  In the best known of these controversies, it forced incumbent telephone 
companies to let their rivals lease indefinitely, at low regulated rates, most aspects of existing 
telephone networks, including all elements needed to provide local voice service (in the so-called 
“UNE-P” arrangement).  The FCC clung to that maximal leasing policy until forced to change 
course by two separate decisions of the D.C. Circuit in 2002 and 2004.
14 
In those decisions, the court explained that the agency had struck the wrong balance 
between the ostensible benefits of forced sharing and the costs, “including disincentives to 
research and development by both [incumbents] and [competitors] and the tangled management 
inherent in shared use of a common resource.”
15  Explicitly invoking the economic logic of the 
essential facilities doctrine, the court all but instructed the FCC to limit its compulsory leasing 
regime to network elements that exhibit “natural monopoly” characteristics that “would make 
genuine competitive provision of an element’s function wasteful.”
16  The court added that, while 
“scholars have raised very serious questions about the wisdom of the essential facilities doctrine 
as a justification for judicial mandates of competitor access, . . . a doctrine that is adequate for 
that purpose may nonetheless offer useful concepts for agency guidance when Congress has 
directed an agency to provide competitor access in a specific industry.”
17   
More fundamentally, the Commission’s UNE-P policy paid insufficient heed to antitrust 
law’s admonition against focusing more on the success of selected competitors  than on the 
setting the ground rules for economically efficient competition.
18  Alfred Kahn, for example, has 
                                                 
14 See United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“USTA I”); United States Telecom 
Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“USTA II”); see generally DIGITAL CROSSROADS, ch. 3.  In each case, 
the author of the court’s opinion was Judge Stephen Williams, a former professor of administrative law who has 
played a leading role in incorporating the insights of the law and economics movement into American jurisprudence. 
15 USTA I, 290 F.3d at 429. 
16 Id. at 437. 
17 Id. 437 n.4 (emphasis added). 
18 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (emphasizing that antitrust law serves to protect 
“competition, not competitors”).  Justice Breyer has argued, in a number of contexts, that the FCC has made this 
very error.  See Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 539 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting); AT&T v. 
Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366, 412 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting); STEPHEN BREYER, ECONOMIC REASONING   8
accused the FCC of consistently ignoring the “difference between regulatory interventions 
establishing the conditions under which competition may be relied on to determine the outcome 
and interventions intended, whether consciously or unconsciously, to dictate that outcome.”
19   
We do not mean to suggest that the Commission was wrong when it adopted a UNE-P 
policy at the outset, for there might have been sound reasons in 1996 for erring on the side of 
jump-starting competition in a previously monopolistic market.  Rather, the Commission’s error 
lay in viewing UNE-P as an end in itself rather than as a short-term means to a long-term goal of 
facilities-based competition in local telephone markets after such a jump-start.  In allowing for 
the indefinite availability of UNE-P, the FCC arguably slowed the transition to a world where 
competitors do not rely entirely on the incumbent’s facilities.  The result may have been a net 
loss for consumer welfare:  facilities-based competition frees up a competitor to provide a broad 
range of services that the incumbent telephone company does not offer and thus facilitates both 
product variety and market-oriented pricing.  Where market entry is dominated by UNE-P, in 
contrast, competitors can offer only limited product variety and regulation-oriented pricing.  
To this point, we have addressed the FCC’s treatment of legacy network elements used in 
the provision of ordinary voice telephone service; next, we briefly consider its treatment of 
elements used for broadband Internet access and other bandwidth-intensive data applications.
20  
Here the Commission’s track record is mixed.  In recent years, the Commission has tended to 
avoid subjecting telephone companies to facilities-leasing obligations for “next-generation” 
network elements such as fiber-to-the-home loops, reasoning that a telephone company may 
never invest in these capital-intensive facilities to begin with if compulsory sharing obligations 
commoditize them from the beginning.
21  Particularly given the leadership of cable companies in 
the residential broadband market, that is an entirely sensible concern, and one quite familiar to 
                                                                                                                                                             
AND  JUDICIAL  REVIEW  8-10 (Brookings Inst. Press, 2003) (amplifying his criticisms of FCC decisions) 
(http://www.aei.brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=840). 
19 A LFRED  KAHN,  LETTING  GO:  DEREGULATING THE PROCESS OF DEREGULATION  70 (Inst. of Pub. Utils. and 
Network Indus., 1998).  Some commentators argue that the very exercise of mandating network sharing is doomed 
to failure.  For example, Wharton School professor Gerry Faulhaber has suggested that a compulsory leasing regime 
designed to facilitate new entry is “virtually unregulable” where, as in this industry, the terms of access are 
complicated and the incumbent remains a competitor in the market. Gerald R. Faulhaber, Policy-Induced 
Competition: The Telecommunications Experiments, 15 INFORMATION  ECONOMICS AND POLICY  73, 79, 86, 92 
(2003).  Faulhaber is equally skeptical of the plans that call for a split between the incumbent’s wholesale and retail 
operations, calling them “optimistic in the extreme.”  Id. at 93.  We do not consider these issues here. 
20 For a fuller treatment of these issues, see DIGITAL CROSSROADS, ch. 5.     9
antitrust (and intellectual property) lawyers.
22  Even here, however, the Commission dragged its 
heels for several years—until late 2004—before it followed through on this policy and, by 
exercising its forbearance authority, insulated these elements from the last vestiges of 
compulsory leasing.
23  
At the same time, the FCC has made a hash of competition policy in its separate 
treatment of “line-sharing.”  Line-sharing involves dividing control of an ordinary copper loop 
between the incumbent telephone company, which continues to provide voice service over the 
lower frequency bands of the loop, and a competitive data carrier, which offers DSL service over 
the higher frequency bands of the same loop.  Because the incumbent still collects the full retail 
rate for telephone service in such arrangements, regulators typically required the line-sharers to 
pay little or nothing for this partial use of the loop.   
As an original matter, both sides—the incumbents and the competitive data carriers—
could invoke considerations familiar to antitrust lawyers to justify their conflicting views on the 
merits of line-sharing obligations.  The competitive data carriers could plausibly characterize 
copper telephone loops as “essential facilities” in the antitrust sense.  And, because such loops 
have long been part of the legacy telephone network, forcing incumbent telephone companies to 
share them created few of the investment disincentives that prompted the Commission to exclude 
next-generation fiber-based elements from the mandatory leasing list.  As FCC Chairman 
Michael Powell explained, “[l]ine sharing rides on the old copper infrastructure, not on the new 
advanced fiber networks that we are attempting to push to deployment.”
24  In a similar vein, 
Alfred Kahn argued that the sunk nature of the copper loop infrastructure “would seem to 
[present] the archetypal case for mandatory sharing—a heritage of their franchised monopolies, 
the sharing of which would therefore not seem to involve any discouragement of future risk-
taking investment.”
25  Line-sharing also promised some consumer benefits not just because it 
                                                                                                                                                             
21 Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Review of the Section 251 
Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 18 FCC Rcd 19,020 (2003) (“Triennial Review 
Order”). 
22 See III Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, P 707, at 180 (rev. ed. 1996) (“diminishing the inventor's reward 
reduces incentives for inventive activity and seems inconsistent with the premise of the patent system.”). 
23 See Memorandum Opinion and Order, Petition for Forbearance of the Verizon Telephone Companies Pursuant to 
47 U.S.C. § 160(c), WC Docket No. 01-338 (October 27, 2004).  
24 Triennial Review Order, Separate Statement of Chairman Michael K. Powell Approving in Part and Dissenting in 
Part, at 2. 
25 Alfred Kahn, Regulatory Politics As Usual, AEI-Brookings Joint Center, March 3, 2003 (http://www.aei-
brookings.org/policy/page.php?id=127).    10
would facilitate an alternative last-mile delivery option, but also because, according to Kahn, 
“the competition that flowed from it likely would have pressured incumbents to deploy more 
advanced networks in order to move from the negative regulatory pole to the positive regulatory 
pole, by deploying more fiber infrastructure.”
26 
On the other hand, opponents of line-sharing could invoke practical concerns to justify a 
limited application of antitrust’s essential facilities doctrine:  novel and complex facilities-
sharing obligations present difficult implementation issues and impose significant administrative 
and other network costs.
27   Simply as an operational matter, shared management of the loop 
requires an incumbent to invest millions of dollars in upgrades to existing computer system.  
These are costs that the incumbent would otherwise avoid and that it may never recover 
(particularly if line-sharers do not materialize to compensate it).  Moreover, in the absence of 
line-sharing rights, competitive data carriers can still offer their DSL service over an incumbent’s 
copper loop if they agree to lease the loop as a whole (although they would then pay a much 
higher price and may sometimes face a practical need to pair up with a competitive provider of 
conventional telephone service). 
In 1999, the FCC ruled in favor of the competitive data carriers and rejected the 
arguments against line-sharing.  Several years later, after the D.C. Circuit expressed serious 
skepticism about the merits of this policy choice,
28 the Commission began phasing out such 
obligations altogether.
29  Two features of that decision are noteworthy.  First, the FCC closed the 
door on line-sharing obligations only after the millions of dollars in needed systems upgrades 
had already been spent.  The FCC thus inflicted on the economy many of the (sunk) costs of line-
sharing while foreclosing any opportunity to realize the full competitive benefits.  Second, on the 
day the FCC announced the demise of line-sharing, four out of the FCC’s five commissioners 
indicated substantive disagreement with this very outcome.  Two of those four appeared to have 
cast their deciding votes against line-sharing as part of an ultimately futile log-rolling exercise 
designed to ensure three votes (in the same FCC order) for the preservation of UNE-P.
30  Against 
                                                 
26 Id.  On some accounts, Japan’s spur for increased broadband deployment was the use of line-sharing by an 
innovative competitor (Softbank) of the incumbent provider (NTT). See David S. Isenberg, Japan’s Broadband 
Miracle, VON MAGAZINE (Sept/Oct 2004)    (http://www.vonmag.com/issue/2004/sepoct/columns/isenberg.htm). 
27 See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 124 S. Ct. 874, 883(2004). 
28 USTA I, 290 F.3d at 428-30. 
29 Triennial Review Order, 18 FCC Rcd 19,020 ¶255-263. 
30 In congressional testimony, for example, Commissioner Copps made clear that he did not agree with the part of 
the decision he voted for on line sharing, explaining that “I would have preferred to maintain this access, also known   11
this backdrop, it is difficult to disagree with Kahn’s assessment of that order as “an abomination, 




Monopoly Leveraging Concerns And The Internet   
Our discussion of facilities-leasing obligations illustrates how a greater regard for 
antitrust doctrine—and, in particular, the economic insights underlying that doctrine—would 
strengthen the analytical foundations of telecommunications regulation.  Antitrust doctrine also 
has much to contribute to a rapidly intensifying debate:  the extent to which the government 
should regulate physical-layer network owners to protect the “openness” of the Internet and its 
traditional “end-to-end” architecture.
32  In answering this question, policymakers must see 
beyond the legacy regulatory distinctions that have long guided this analysis, and should focus 
instead on the first principles of antitrust in analyzing the potential for anti-consumer abuse in 
the relationships among the various markets for last-mile transmission, Internet access, and 
higher-layer Internet applications and content offerings.   
 
The Legacy Regulatory Strategy 
  The current telecommunications marketplace bears little resemblance to the one 
envisioned in the 1996 Act, mostly because Congress did not anticipate how the Internet would 
up-end the telecommunications industry.  Until very recently, all telecommunications services 
were joined hip to hip with the particular facilities on which they were provided.  Federal 
communications law, written mostly in a pre-convergent era, is compartmentalized into different 
substantive “titles” that apply distinct regulatory schemes to different types of networks.   
Wireline telephone companies are subject to “common carrier” regulation under Title II of the 
Communications Act of 1934, and their retail services are subject to the traditional division of 
regulatory authority between the FCC and the states. Use of the airwaves, such as for over-the-
                                                                                                                                                             
as line sharing.  I believe line sharing has made a contribution to the competitive landscape.”  Health of the 
Telecommunications Sector: A Perspective from the Commissioners of the Federal Communications Commission, 
before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet (Feb. 26, 2003).  Commissioner Copps explained, 
however, that he “had to accept” the Order’s treatment of line sharing “in order to reach compromise.”  Id.   
31 Alfred E. Kahn, Regulatory Politics as Usual, POLICY  MATTERS 03-3 (Mar. 2003) 
(http://www.aei.brookings.org/policy/page.php?id=127).  
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air broadcasting or cellular telephone service, is regulated in whole or in part under Title III, 
which, among other things, preempts most forms of state regulation.  And “cable services” are 
regulated under Title VI, which essentially divides regulatory responsibility between the FCC 
and local franchising authorities but generally insulates cable providers from common carriage 
obligations.  In revising the Communications Act in 1996, Congress left intact each of these 
three statutory “silos,” as they are disparagingly known, along with the markedly different rules 
contained in each for governing the corresponding physical-layer platform. 
The Internet holds such rigid service-specific distinctions in contempt. Each of these 
three physical-layer media—the wireline telephone network, the airwaves, and cable company 
infrastructure—is capable of providing Internet access, and the Internet in turn can serve as a 
platform for any communications service imaginable.  Every single form of content ever 
conveyed over any electronic communications system—voice (telephony), audio (radio), video 
(television), documents (faxes), and so forth—can be instantly converted into 1s and 0s and 
transmitted as the cargo in digital packets flying over the Internet, no matter what the underlying 
physical medium. 
The Internet has thus radically transformed the industry by using the Internet’s layered 
architecture, together with the power of broadband platforms, to decouple particular services 
from the physical networks over which they have traditionally been provided.  This phenomenon 
of convergence is attributable to the Internet’s openness and modularity—its 
compartmentalization of computer-enhanced communications into separate physical, logical, 
applications, and content layers.
33  Competition and product diversity have flourished on the 
Internet’s higher layers because the universality of the Internet’s core protocols liberates 
applications and content providers (like RealNetworks and eBay) from any need to become 
Internet service providers (like AOL or Earthlink) or last-mile transmission providers (like 
Comcast or BellSouth).  The Internet also generally frees independent applications developers 
and content providers from the control of any network owner, for they can rely on the open and 
non-discriminatory protocols of the Internet’s logical layer—the TCP/IP protocol suite—to 
deliver their innovations to consumers.  Indeed, as Andrew Odlyzko observes, the Internet’s 
openness to outside innovation has proved critical to its success.  “In spite of many attempts,” he 
contends, “the established service providers and their suppliers have an abysmal record in 
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innovation in user services . . . . The real ‘killer apps,’ such as email, the Web, browsers, search 
engines, [instant messaging], and Napster, have all come from users.”
34    
When it drafted the 1996 Act, Congress did not account for these or the many other 
respects in which the Internet would subsequently destabilize the regulatory status quo.   
Although Congress anticipated some degree of convergence among different technology 
platforms, it focused almost exclusively on the prospect that cable companies would offer 
circuit-switched telephony and that telephone companies would offer video programming.  But 
Congress did not foresee the critical head-to-head competition between cable and telephone 
companies in the mass market for broadband Internet access; indeed, in 1996, both DSL and 
cable modem service remained, for the most part, futuristic projects known only to a few 
industry insiders.  Nor, more generally, did Congress anticipate that voice, video, and data would 
someday be reduced to streams of bits running on top of a single and universal logical-layer 
platform, the Internet protocol, which itself can be used on virtually any physical-layer 
transmission medium.
35   
The growth of broadband Internet access, combined with the ubiquity of the TCP/IP 
protocol suite, has made a mockery of the Communications Act’s traditional classifications of 
different communications services.  Nonetheless, because Congress underestimated the pace and 
extent of technological convergence, those classifications remain embedded in the law.  As a 
result, the industry has become increasingly fixated on lawyers’ quarrels about the proper way to 
“characterize” particular IP-based services for purposes of classifying each of them within the 
obsolescent framework of the Communications Act of 1934.  The services at issue in these 
classification battles run the gamut from broadband platforms such as cable modem service to 
higher-layer applications such as “voice over Internet protocol” (“VoIP”) and, in the not-too-
distant future, IP-based video services offered by some telephone companies. 
If we could rewrite telecommunications law from scratch, of course, there would be no 
need for such classifications, for they lack any economic or technological foundation.  Under 
current law, however, these classifications are centrally important.  Until the law is changed, 
therefore, the structure of this industry will continue to hinge on the outcome of arcane legal 
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disputes, such as the issue presented in the Brand X case that the Supreme Court will decide later 
this spring.
36 
Given the Internet’s modular structure, a number of commentators have urged 
policymakers to replace the Act’s regulatory silos with a more antitrust-oriented “horizontal” 
approach that focuses on the critical role of layering in modern telecommunications.
37  They 
argue that the only rational way to regulate the Internet industry is to draw lines within the 
Internet’s layered hierarchy to distinguish between (i) those layers (if any) that should be subject 
to continued economic regulation because there is insufficient competition within them and (ii) 
those layers that should not be subject to such regulation because they are presumptively 
competitive.
38  For example, under this layer-oriented approach, VoIP services, as applications 
riding on top of physical-layer platforms, would not be subject to public utility regulation of the 
sort imposed by Title II, because there are no extraordinary barriers to the entry of new VoIP 
providers into the market. The underlying physical-layer platforms themselves may or may not 
be subject to such regulation, depending on (for example) the potential for discrimination against 
higher-layer providers.    
Although the “layering” nomenclature is new, this concern about interlayer 
discrimination has long been invoked to justify heavy regulation of physical-layer transmission 
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providers.  The concern underlies the Computer Inquiry rules that, as discussed below, have 
required telephone companies for several decades to provide nondiscriminatory network services 
to unaffiliated information service providers.  It animates the many proposals to force cable 
companies to open up their cable modem networks for “multiple ISP access.”  More recently, it 
has led Larry Lessig, Tim Wu, and even the deregulatory Michael Powell to advocate voluntary 
and, if necessary, government-mandated adherence to “Net neutrality” principles.  Such 
principles would require each broadband service provider to justify any deviation from the 
Internet’s traditional end-to-end principle (i.e., any discrimination among IP packets on the basis 
of their origin or type) that operates to the disadvantage of unaffiliated providers of Internet 
applications and content.  All of these proposals are motivated by the same fear:  that given 
broadband providers will try to leverage their putative monopolies in the physical-layer 
transmission market to suppress fair competition in the adjacent content and applications 
markets.  
Such “monopoly leveraging” concerns, however, tend to worry antitrust practitioners less 
often than they worry conventional regulators.  That is not because the antitrust practitioners are 
less vigilant in guarding against genuine monopoly abuses, but because—as a general rule—they 
tend to be more familiar with the sometimes counterintuitive economic insights of antitrust 
doctrine, discussed in the next subsection.   
Skepticism that regulators would conduct any rigorous economic analysis in addressing 
monopoly-leveraging concerns has led some industry analysts to oppose any layers-oriented 
regime altogether.  Commentator George Gilder, for example, cautions that any layers-based 
approach, by seeking to preserve the Internet in its current modular form, “ignore[s] ever 
changing trade-offs between integration and modularization,” slights the importance of 
innovation within the “core” of the network as well as at the edge, and inappropriately 
“assume[s] that there is one network, that it is sufficient and timeless, [and] that no new networks 
are possible or needed.”
39 “The real threat to monopolize and paralyze the Internet,” he 
concludes, “is not the communications industry and its suppliers, but the premature modularizers 
and commoditizers, the proponents of the dream of some final government solution for the 
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uncertainties of all life and commerce.”
40 Similarly, a coalition of industry advocates warned the 
FCC in July 2004 that, even though engineers view the Internet in terms of layers, regulators 
should not design competition policy in those terms as well.
41 The coalition directed its critique 
at a much-discussed MCI white paper that argued not just for a layers-oriented regulatory model 
in the abstract, but for a more substantive conclusion that the physical layer—specifically, the 
market for wholesale transmission services—is dominated by incumbent telephone companies 
and should be heavily regulated as such.
42 
Unfortunately, many commentators involved in this debate often seem incapable of 
separating the analytical structure of a layers-oriented policy model from the substantive 
conclusions that MCI—perceived as that model’s chief exponent—seeks to impose on the 
industry, including presumptions (i) in favor of physical-layer regulation and (ii) against 
unfettered vertical integration by physical-layer providers into the adjacent layers for 
applications and content.
43  As we next discuss, however, a layers-oriented analytical structure 
does not necessarily support MCI’s proposed conclusions, for reasons that antitrust doctrine 
makes abundantly clear.   
 
A Next-Generation Regulatory Strategy 
To recap, the issue at stake in the debate over broadband policy is when, if ever, the 
government should intervene to keep physical-layer transmission providers from leveraging their 
control of last-mile facilities to discriminate against unaffiliated providers of applications and 
content.  Of course, this type of inquiry is hardly unique to the telecommunications field.  There 
are a number of industries in which vertically integrated firms are alleged to have leveraged (or 
preserved) their monopoly in one market by thwarting competition in others.  And when disputes 
arise about what, if anything, the government should do about that concern, they are usually 
resolved by antitrust law.  In general, antitrust law evaluates such disputes by defining the 
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relevant markets and then evaluating whether the firm in question is dominant in one of those 
markets, whether it has both the incentive and the ability to exploit (or protect) that dominance 
by harming competition in adjacent markets, whether the costs of any antidiscrimination remedy 
outweigh the benefits, and so forth. As communications platforms converge and compete, 
policymakers should look to technology-neutral antitrust principles as a replacement for the 
technology-specific quirks and artifices of the legacy regulatory regime.   
To understand how antitrust doctrine can clarify the challenges of the broadband age, we 
must first review the Computer Inquiries—a regime the FCC first instituted in the 1980s to keep 
telephone companies from exploiting their bottleneck control of transmission facilities to 
eliminate competition in the market for “information services.”  Among other things, the FCC 
directed each telephone company to separate out (unbundle) the raw transmission functions (such 
as high speed circuits) underlying any information service from higher-layer enhancements (such 
as Web hosting); tariff those transmission functions as a stand-alone common carrier service; 
purchase the service for its own use from that tariff; and sell the same service on a non-
discriminatory basis to all unaffiliated information service providers that request it.  Even now, 
in the broadband era, this basic obligation governs the wireline telephone companies regulated as 
common carriers under Title II of the Communications Act.   For example, if a telephone 
company wishes to sell end users a broadband service that bundles Internet access with DSL 
transmission, it must strip out the DSL transmission component of that service, tariff it, and offer 
it on non-discriminatory terms to unaffiliated ISPs.
44   
Two now-obsolete premises underlay this unbundling requirement.  First, telephone 
companies dominated the market for the physical-layer transmission needed for higher-layer 
information services, for they owned the only conduit for two-way, switched transmission in 
most areas.  Second, a telephone company had a strong incentive to leverage that platform 
monopoly to discriminate against unaffiliated information service providers.  Telephone services 
were strictly price-regulated, whereas information services were not, and the provision of 
information services thus gave the telcos an opportunity to recover greater profits than did basic 
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phone services.
45  The central concern was that, in the quest for such profits, telephone 
companies would have both the opportunity and the incentive to leverage their transmission 
monopoly to foreclose price-lowering competition in the information services market. 
The economic justification for such monopoly leveraging concerns has become 
considerably more complicated now that broadband technology has begun supplanting dial-up as 
the Internet access mechanism of choice for consumers. The ascendancy of broadband is 
significant to competition policy for four basic reasons. 
First, it dramatically increases the competitive stakes for the communications industry as 
a whole—and thus the concern that policymakers may have about the full consequences of 
market concentration in the last mile. Widespread use of broadband connections makes industry-
wide technological convergence less of a theoretical possibility and more of an imminent, 
transformative reality. Suddenly, the company that efficiently controls the highest quality pipes 
to end user premises could theoretically dominate not just one communications service, but all 
communications services:  voice, data, and video programming. 
Second, broadband access is marginalizing the ISP intermediaries that, in the narrowband 
environment, have acted as competitive buffers between the monopoly provider of last-mile 
access and the Internet at large. An ISP necessarily plays a less central role in a user’s broadband 
experience than it plays in the traditional dial-up setting. In the latter context, the end user 
scarcely notices the telephone company’s involvement in her relationship to the Internet, because 
the call she places to her ISP appears much the same as any other “local” call, the telephone 
company charges nothing extra for it, and the ISP performs all protocol conversion functions. In 
contrast, a broadband consumer is inevitably aware that the existence, quality, and price of her 
Internet connection depends largely on her cable or telephone company or other platform 
provider. That remains the case whether or not her ISP is affiliated with that company—as it 
usually is. 
These first two factors could be cited as reasons why the arrival of broadband technology 
warrants greater government intervention to prevent monopoly leveraging by providers of last-
mile transmission services.  And, indeed, they are the very factors that Lessig and others cite as 
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the basis for deep concern about the Internet’s future.
46  The third and fourth considerations, 
however, cut very much in the opposite direction. 
The third relates to cross-platform competition. Whereas dial-up Internet access has 
traditionally required the use of a single company’s circuit-switched telephone network, today’s 
Internet access market is subject to competition among rival broadband platforms. Opponents of 
government intervention say that robust platform competition will safeguard the interests of 
consumers better than regulation ever could, avoiding any of the investment disincentives and 
unintended consequences that regulation is often thought to produce. They thus argue that, so 
long as consumers can choose among a range of broadband providers, the resulting competition 
will force each provider to ensure nondiscriminatory use of the Internet; otherwise, consumers 
will retaliate by moving to another platform.
47 
Of course, the prospect of cross-platform competition can protect against anticompetitive 
practices only to the extent that consumers may easily drop one broadband service and subscribe 
to another. Several factors can complicate this competitive dynamic. Although consumers in 
many markets today have a choice of two or more broadband providers (cable, DSL, and perhaps 
satellite and wireless), consumers in sparsely populated areas may have no realistic choice of 
providers at all; indeed, they may be lucky even to have one. Even if they have two, a duopoly—
if it can be expected to persist—is unlikely to produce optimal output and pricing decisions over 
the long term, although it is surely better than a monopoly.
48 Also, consumer choice can provide 
a check on a dominant provider’s market power only to the extent that these platforms are close 
market substitutes. For example, if consumers perceive that cable modem service is significantly 
faster for the money than DSL, they may tolerate some discrimination by their cable modem 
provider against certain applications or content providers before canceling their accounts and 
calling the telephone company. Likewise, if consumers invest heavily in the platform they 
initially adopt—say, by making heavy use of an e-mail address specific to that platform—they 
may hesitate before incurring the costs necessary to switch to an alternative platform.  
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But the central point remains:  over time, consumers can expect increasing choices in the 
broadband marketplace, and those choices will tend to weaken a firm’s incentives to engage in 
significant monopoly leveraging.  As Michael Powell has explained, in stressing the importance 
of broadband rivalry, “[m]agical things happen in competitive markets when there are at least 
three viable, facilities-based competitors.”
49  Much of the current dispute about broadband policy 
reduces to different empirical predictions about how quickly a third platform—such as 3G 
wireless, WiMAX, or powerline—will arise to play a decisive role in the broadband market.  
Even here, however, the question for most consumers is not so much if that third competitor will 
arrive as when.
50 
The final factor that may reduce the need for heavy preemptive safeguards against 
monopoly leveraging—a factor well-known to antitrust practitioners but little discussed in 
regulatory circles—relates to a firm’s internalization of complementary externalities (“ICE”).  
As French economist Antoine Cournot first observed in the nineteenth century, the total profits a 
monopolist can earn if it seeks to leverage its monopoly in one market (here, the market for 
physical-layer broadband access) by dominating a complementary market (here, the applications 
and content markets) are theoretically no greater than the extra profits it could earn in an 
unregulated environment simply by charging more for the monopoly product itself.  This fact 
gives a monopoly platform provider a powerful incentive to enhance its platform’s attractiveness 
to consumers so that more of them will pay a higher price for it.  Accordingly, even a monopolist 
can normally be expected to take whatever steps are necessary, including steps to promote 
competition in the applications market, to spur the creation of complementary products that will 
drive demand for its platform. 
This complementary externalities principle is subject to several exceptions, the best 
known of which is called “Baxter’s law” in honor of the Justice Department antitrust official 
who invoked it in breaking up AT&T in the early 1980s.  As applied here, Baxter’s law holds 
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that a platform monopolist does have strong incentives to monopolize a largely unregulated 
applications market if the platform market itself is subject to rate regulation.
51  As discussed, this 
exception had great significance in the pre-broadband world of the Computer Inquiries because 
regulators have long capped the price that telephone companies may charge consumers for use of 
the circuit-switched telephone network that served as the monopoly platform for Internet access 
(and other information services) for many years.  Because these companies were barred from 
extracting monopoly profits from the use of that platform itself, they had an incentive to extract 
such profits instead by charging supra-competitive rates for Internet access and other information 
services—an objective that would necessarily require discriminating against rival providers that 
could offer subscribers lower, cost-based rates for the same services. The regulatory response, as 
discussed above, was the set of non-discrimination requirements adopted in the Computer 
Inquiries. 
As a general matter, however, Baxter’s law does not apply—and the ICE principle 
arguably does apply—in the broadband world because regulators have not capped the rates that 
providers may charge their customers for broadband Internet access. This fact removes a key 
incentive for even a dominant broadband provider to discriminate against unaffiliated 
applications and content providers, for such discrimination cannot increase the provider’s overall 
profits and could possibly lower them if it degraded consumers’ perceptions of the platform as a 
whole. 
We do not, however, wish to overemphasize this last point, for the ICE principle is 
subject to several additional exceptions beyond Baxter’s law. To take a few examples, a 
dominant broadband firm might have incentives to discriminate against unaffiliated content or 
applications providers if it views them as potential rivals in the platform market itself, as 
Microsoft did when it crushed Netscape to eliminate the “middleware” threat to Windows.   
Similarly, the firm might have such incentives if the applications market is to some extent 
independent of the platform market and is itself subject to scale economies or network effects, or 
if the firm is simply irrational and misperceives how its interests are affected by the ICE 
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principle.
52  Our essential point is this:  even if they enjoy significant market power at the 
physical layer, non-price-regulated broadband providers conceivably might, but do not 
inevitably, have incentives to discriminate against unaffiliated content and applications 
providers.  The complex economics of that point often get lost in the rhetoric about whether to 
force last-mile broadband providers, such as cable or telephone companies, to open up their 
networks to unaffiliated ISPs or to provide non-discriminatory access to content and applications 
providers. 
The debate about whether and how to regulate broadband requires regulators to make a 
high-stakes bet on how the market will evolve.  Most observers agree that, in a world of robust 
competition at the physical layer, consumers will enjoy high-quality, cost-based broadband 
services at that layer and will enjoy full access to the Internet’s applications and content layers 
free from monopoly leveraging.  The policy challenge arises in devising a regulatory strategy 
when the prospects for physical-layer competition are unclear.  Those favoring greater 
government intervention tend to view broadband access as a relatively static market prone to 
monopoly or duopoly over the long term.  On that view, the government should risk creating 
some disincentives for facilities investment at the margins if that is the only means of ensuring 
that at least one of the two main broadband platforms remains open to a range of complementary 
higher-layer providers who might otherwise be shut out of the market.  These proponents of a 
greater government role also express great skepticism that regulation actually does deter any 
provider from building facilities when it is efficient to do so.  
By contrast, those favoring less intervention tend to view the heavy hand of regulation as 
both unnecessary and affirmatively harmful.  First, they view the broadband market as dynamic 
in a Schumpeterian sense—i.e., subject to the emergence of new broadband platforms that, 
without regulatory prodding, will undermine any market dominance of the established players.
53  
Second, they believe that, especially in a technologically uncertain environment, the costs of 
regulation—as illustrated by past regulatory failures—should create a presumption against 
aggressive government intervention.  They express particular concern that, by imposing 
compulsory “open access” or “Net neutrality” rules on network owners, they will so 
commoditize the resulting networks, and thus so reduce the upside profit potential for network 
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investment, that firms will lack any economic incentive to risk billions of dollars in the 
construction of those networks in the first place.
54  Regulation, these regulatory minimalists 
conclude, is at best a gratuitous source of transaction costs and rent-seeking and at worst a 
gravely misconceived brake on the broadband roll-out and, by extension, on the U.S. economy as 
a whole.  
Who is right?  At this point, the answer is as philosophical as it is empirical, and it will 
become clear only in hindsight, if at all.  In a sense, the broadband market confronts the FCC 
with the same theoretical question as the Computer Inquiries: how to chart a sensible regulatory 
course in an uncertain technological environment.  Two differences between now and then are 
that (i) no single provider has a monopoly on transmission services in most markets and (ii) 
Baxter’s law (the most prominent exception to the ICE principle) no longer applies because 
broadband services are not price-regulated.  Each of those factors tends to cut against the need 
for heavy regulation at the physical layer.  Whether or not those factors are dispositive, they are 
without question highly relevant.  Regulators will develop a more sensible next-generation 
policy regime if Congress permits them—indeed, compels them—to take full account of the 
basic economic insights that guide modern antitrust doctrine.
55 
 
2. First Principles of Institutional Reform 
 
To this point, we have argued that, as a substantive  matter, the first principles  of 
telecommunications competition policy in the Internet age should be largely informed by the first 
principles of antitrust.  Adopting that substantive position, however, would not itself resolve a 
distinct  institutional  question:  if we could remake current institutional arrangements from 
scratch, would we commit this antitrust-oriented project to the FCC or, as Peter Huber and others 
have suggested, to generalist antitrust courts?
56   
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This question may seem largely academic, and perhaps it is:  few people expect Congress 
to strip the FCC of its preeminent role in telecommunications competition policy and return the 
industry—as before 1996—to the plenary supervision of antitrust courts.  On the other hand, no 
one can accurately predict today what sorts of proposals will gain traction in Congress if the 
entirety of telecommunications is opened up for reconsideration.  And Congress might well be 
sympathetic to calls for incremental reductions in the FCC’s role, if not the complete elimination 
of that role, in the expectation that ex post antitrust enforcement will fill in the gaps.  In this 
portion of the paper, we explain why, in our view, supplanting the FCC’s role in favor of judicial 
antitrust enforcement would present considerable costs in addition to the ostensible benefits.  
And we conclude by discussing several institutional reforms needed to reorient the FCC from 
prescriptive regulator of entrenched monopolies to a less interventionist overseer of conduct in 
an increasingly competitive market. 
 
Four Institutional Objectives  
Let us start, though, with first principles.  If we were drawing on a blank slate, how 
would we divide up authority between antitrust courts and the FCC for the oversight of 
competition policy in this industry?  One’s answer to that question depends, of course, on how 
one judges the criteria for success in any political arrangement.  We will focus on four criteria 
that seem particularly critical to the health of this industry:  determinacy, expertise, neutrality, 
and humility. The first two of these criteria are straightforward; the third and fourth less so.  
We begin with determinacy.  A regulatory regime is determinate if its governing 
institutions—Congress, regulatory agencies, and the courts—work together smoothly and 
expeditiously enough that the industry knows as quickly as possible what the ground rules for 
competition policy will be and can predict with reasonable precision how those rules will be 
applied.  The more determinate these ground rules are, the more comfortable investors will be in 
placing bets on the future of this industry, and the more likely it is that innovators will obtain 
financing to put their ideas to work for the public good.  Particularly in a dynamic industry like 
telecommunications, it is often “more important,” as Justice Brandeis once put it, “that the 
applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right.”
57 
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Expertise, our second value, means that primary decisionmaking authority should be 
committed to institutions that understand, or can easily learn, the esoteric technology of 
telecommunications, the structure of the industry, and the complex economic and regulatory 
issues that have defined this field for many years.  
The third value that a particular competition policy strategy should promote is 
analytically rigorous neutrality in the resolution of controversial policy issues.  This concept is 
subtler than the first two.  By “neutrality,” we mean that whoever writes the rules for competition 
policy should think of problems by reference to first principles about how to maximize consumer 
welfare, which for the most part are antitrust principles.  Those making the rules should thus not 
focus on the needs and wants of particular industry factions in their role as political actors, as 
Congress and the FCC have often been accused of doing.  Finally, neutrality means that, when 
considering proposals for regulatory reform, policymakers should begin by asking, “why have 
we done it this way for so long?” rather than “why should we incur the political costs of 
changing our long-standing policy on this issue?”  
Our fourth value, and admittedly the vaguest, is humility. We use the term to describe the 
attitude of a policymaker who, with every important decision, remembers the many times in 
which other policymakers have been flatly wrong in their predictions of how the 
telecommunications market would take shape and in their assessments of the regulatory 
measures needed to enhance consumer welfare within that evolving market. Humility also 
reminds policymakers that, over the long term, the unintended, undesired consequences of 
regulation can dwarf the intended, desired outcomes. That fact is not a reason for doing nothing 
when action is needed to correct genuine market failures.  But it is a reason for policymakers to 
respect the market’s ability to enhance consumer welfare and, as they evaluate the predicted 
benefits of their own regulatory involvement, to give due regard to the unpredictable course of 
technological and economic change. 
 
Antitrust:  The Institutional Alternative  
Arguably, generalist courts, largely immune from interest group politics and from 
entrenched assumptions about how the world must work, are better equipped than specialized 
agencies to resolve competition policy issues on their economic merits.  With no lobbyists to 
appease and no bureaucracies to keep busy, antitrust courts, at least in theory, should do a better   26
job than the FCC or other specialized agencies in resolving such issues with analytically rigorous 
neutrality. Perhaps the purest endorsement of courts over agencies as guardians of 
telecommunications competition policy appears in the scholarship of Peter Huber. In his view, 
the FCC and its “army of federal employees hanging around indefinitely to meddle and mess up” 
should be abolished altogether in favor of minimalist, case-by-case antitrust enforcement.
58  
Of course, antitrust courts are only as neutral as the judges who sit on them, and not all 
judges are exemplars of neutrality. A district judge selected to decide a critical antitrust case 
might do quite a bit worse than Judge Harold Greene, who administered the twelve-year antitrust 
regime under the AT&T consent decree and, in that capacity, made a number of controversial 
policy judgments about the trajectory of competition within the industry.
59 The risks of vesting 
such enormous power in a single generalist district court judge are compounded by forum-
shopping opportunities that sometimes enable an industry faction to choose, for the resolution of 
critical industry-wide controversies, whatever court the faction considers unusually sympathetic 
to its cause. In one well-known example, two Bell companies brought their constitutional 
challenge to a key provision of the 1996 Act—section 271, which governs Bell entry into long 
distance markets—in the remote Wichita Falls Division of a federal district court in Texas.   
There the desired judge, Joe Kendall, obliged them by invalidating section 271 and several other 
provisions on New Year’s Eve in 1997.
60 Although Kendall’s decision was eventually reversed, 
it symbolizes the dangers of letting individual judges play too significant a role in shaping the 
future of this uniquely volatile industry. 
  Huber is nonetheless correct that the FCC, like any entrenched bureaucracy, has 
developed a self-sustaining bias in favor of keeping itself important by intervening heavily in the 
industry it regulates. That bias indulges rent-seeking behavior and invites overregulation, with all 
of its attendant inefficiencies. Whenever an industry requires broad oversight, however, similar 
bureaucracies tend to arise spontaneously no matter what institution is formally charged with 
conducting the oversight. For example, the AT&T consent decree regime produced its own small 
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“army of federal employees” in the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division who devoted a dozen 
years of their careers to the zealous enforcement of the decree’s manifold restrictions. That group 
of lawyers and economists was not necessarily less disposed to government intervention in the 
telecommunications market than the FCC is today. Ultimately, Huber’s institutional preference 
for antitrust courts over regulatory agencies could eliminate such bureaucracies only when he 
and his fellow libertarians are granted their substantive wish for a negligible government role of 
any kind in the oversight of telecommunications competition. That wish, however, is likely to 
be—and should be—granted only in the long term, once the market for last-mile transmission 
becomes more robustly competitive than it now is. 
The more basic problem with relying on antitrust courts to superintend the 
telecommunications industry is that the judicial process is deficient in the areas of determinacy 
and expertise. Consider determinacy first. Companies with market power need to know now, not 
at the end of a multi-year antitrust suit, whether the aggressive business strategy they are 
contemplating will subject them to treble damages under the Sherman Act in the future.
61  This 
will be a special concern in the telecommunications industry for many years to come, given the 
prevalence of claims—many of them plausible—that certain firms still dominate particular 
markets despite the inexorable growth of cross-platform competition. Likewise, the absence of a 
regulatory agency to develop and enforce pre-set rules would also make it more difficult for 
industry pioneers to compete with a dominant firm, particularly if they lack the money or 
endurance to prosecute an antitrust suit.  Finally, and perhaps most important, the industry needs 
settled rules on intractable market-wide problems that would elude any straightforward antitrust 
solution, such as the termination rates that any carrier—dominant or non-dominant—may charge 
others for the privilege of terminating calls that are originated on other carriers’ networks.
62  In 
short, prescriptive regulation should theoretically do a better job than after-the-fact antitrust 
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enforcement in providing all industry actors with greater certainty sooner rather than later—
although, as we will discuss, reality does not always match that theory.  
Generalist courts also lack the technical expertise needed to make fully informed 
judgments about the market consequences of any substantive remedies they order. As Frank 
Easterbrook observes, “[j]udges are the regulators with the broadest portfolios, and thus are the 
least competent.”
63 In theory, this shortcoming could be alleviated either by relegating 
telecommunications competition issues to specialized courts (much as Congress assigned all 
patent law appeals to the Federal Circuit) or by permitting judges to retain experts who can 
explain the industry to them. But these measures present considerable challenges of their own.
64 
Indeed, ever careful to preserve the appearance of judicial self-sufficiency, the courts have 
sometimes expressed outright hostility to the use of retained experts to help resolve technically 
complex litigation on the merits, as illustrated by the D.C. Circuit’s 1998 order barring Judge 
Thomas Penfield Jackson from using Lawrence Lessig as a special master in one phase of the 
Microsoft antitrust case.
65 Just as important, generalist judges lack both the resources and the 
technical proficiency to resolve the thousands of day-to-day disputes, on pricing and other issues, 
that must be decided under any local competition regime that involves even minimal leasing and 
interconnection rights.
66 Aware of these limitations, the judiciary has generally shown much 
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solicitude for the greater expertise of regulatory agencies within the scope of their substantive 
authority.
67 
These institutional concerns about antitrust courts form the backdrop to the Supreme 
Court’s 2004 decision in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko.
68 
which concluded that such courts are generally inappropriate forums for the ongoing 
management of telecommunications competition policy, at least so long as the industry remains 
subject to pervasive regulation. Our discussion of Trinko first requires a brief review of the 
historical intersection between judicial antitrust enforcement and prescriptive 
telecommunications regulation. 
Before 1996, as we have noted, much of telecommunications competition policy was 
managed by a single judge:  Harold Greene.  In 1982, AT&T agreed to the consent decree that 
ultimately spun off the Bell companies only after Greene rejected the company’s argument that 
the FCC’s comprehensive oversight of the industry precluded any role for antitrust enforcement. 
Greene found that argument unpersuasive because, as demonstrated by years of regulatory 
indecision, “the Commission is not and has not been capable of effective enforcement of the laws 
governing AT&T’s behavior.”
69  When it called for the termination of that consent decree in 
1996, Congress directed the FCC and its state counterparts to implement wireline competition 
provisions that go far beyond the FCC’s traditional mandate to require interconnection among 
carriers on just and reasonable terms.  At the same time, however, Congress included an antitrust 
“savings clause” providing that “nothing in the Act or in the amendments made by this Act shall 
be construed to modify, impair or supercede the applicability of any antitrust laws.”
70 
Like so many other provisions of the 1996 Act, this one led to widespread disagreement.  
Some argued that, despite the savings clause, antitrust courts should generally defer to regulators 
in deciding whether particular conduct is genuinely anticompetitive and, if so, what sorts of 
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enforcement mechanisms would be appropriate for addressing it.
71 But others contended that the 
savings clause preserves antitrust remedies as a backstop for the protection of competitors 
whenever prescriptive regulation proves ineffective in keeping incumbents from exploiting any 
market power they might have.
72 These commentators further maintained that, as in the AT&T 
antitrust litigation, defendants should have to bear the burden of proving that, as a factual matter, 
regulatory mechanisms are sufficiently effective to make antitrust intervention unnecessary. The 
major theories of liability expounded by these advocates of continued antitrust enforcement 
included the controversial “essential facilities” doctrine discussed in Part I above. 
In  Trinko, the Supreme Court resolved this debate with a resounding victory for 
telecommunications antitrust defendants in general and the Bell companies in particular. The 
Court began by explaining that, although the antitrust savings clause “preserves claims that 
satisfy existing antitrust standards, it does not create new claims that go beyond existing antitrust 
standards.”
73 Then, in setting forth those existing standards, the Court sharply limited the 
circumstances in which courts may impose antitrust remedies—under the essential facilities 
doctrine or any other—for a monopolist’s refusal to help rivals compete with it. Such remedies 
often do more harm than good, the Court reasoned, “because of the uncertain virtue of forced 
sharing and the difficulty of identifying and remedying anticompetitive conduct by a single 
firm,” and because “[m]istaken inferences and the resulting false condemnations are especially 
costly” in that “they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect” by 
“lessen[ing] the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in . . . economically 
beneficial facilities.”
74  
Moving from substantive to institutional concerns, the court added that “[e]nforced 
sharing also requires antitrust courts to act as central planners, identifying the proper price, 
quantity, and other terms of dealing—a role for which they are ill-suited.”
75 Finally, the Court 
concluded, “[t]he 1996 Act’s extensive provision for access” to an incumbent’s facilities and 
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services on regulated terms makes it as unnecessary as it is potentially harmful “to impose a 
judicial doctrine of forced access.”
76  
In sum, whatever the right institutional arrangement might have been as an original 
matter, specialized regulatory agencies, led by the FCC, will play the dominant role in setting 
telecommunications competition policy for the foreseeable future—although, to be sure, the 
post-Trinko fate of antitrust claims unrelated to the essential facilities doctrine remains unclear.
77 
We close by turning to the FCC’s performance in that role and the prospects for improving upon 
it.  
 
The FCC In Transition 
As Winston Churchill remarked in 1947: “Many forms of Government have been tried, 
and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. . . . No one pretends that democracy is perfect or 
all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all 
those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”
78 Continued reliance on the FCC is 
likewise the worst way to superintend competition issues in the telecommunications industry—
except for the alternatives. The problem lies not in expertise, for the FCC has plenty of that. The 
problem lies instead in the FCC’s ability to serve the other three values we discussed in Part II in 




In theory, Congress delegates legislative rulemaking authority to administrative agencies 
not just because they are expert in their designated fields, but also because they, unlike Congress, 
have the institutional agility needed to adjust the rules promptly to accommodate changes in 
market conditions. In reality, the FCC has long displayed a regrettable tendency to string out its 
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decisions on important matters, despite the D.C. Circuit’s exasperated admonition to it more than 
half a century ago that “[a]gency inaction can be as harmful as wrong action.”
79 
 Congress has sometimes addressed this problem, with great effect, by giving the FCC 
strict statutory deadlines for the resolution of particularly time-sensitive issues. For example, the 
FCC completed its work on the initial implementation of sections 251 and 252 within the 
specified 180-day period after passage of the 1996 Act,
80 and, at least on paper, met the separate 
90-day deadline under section 271 for deciding any Bell application to enter the long distance 
market in a particular state.
81 Sometimes, however, the FCC manages to elude congressionally 
mandated deadlines, as illustrated by its October 2003 decision to defer any resolution on the 
merits of a petition seeking forbearance from residual broadband unbundling obligations.
82 And 
a great many of the Commission’s most significant rulemaking proceedings have dragged on for 
many years because they are subject to no statutory deadline at all. 
Such delays stem in part from the elaborate behind-the-scenes dealmaking needed to 
reach consensus among the Commission’s five members. Like cabinet officials, those members 
are appointed by the president and confirmed by Congress; unlike cabinet officials, however, no 
more than three of them may belong to the same political party, and, once confirmed, they may 
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be removed during their five-year terms only for cause.
83 The result is that members other than 
the chairman, even those who belong to the chairman’s (and president’s) party, may worry more 
about pleasing their separate constituencies within Congress or the industry than about pleasing 
the White House. This is a recipe for internecine intrigue and deliberative inefficiency.  
Some have cited these concerns as a reason to place the FCC more firmly within the 
Executive Branch, eliminate the current five member structure, and vest plenary authority in a 
single decisionmaker at the top of the FCC’s organizational chart, much as Congress has 
organized the Food and Drug Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency.
84 That 
proposal has much to commend it. Given the unprecedented pace of change that the Internet has 
brought to the telecommunications industry, the dilatory costs of the FCC’s multi-member 
structure may now outweigh whatever benefits it was once thought to present in the form of 
internal checks and balances.
85 Any such reform, however, would face severe political obstacles 
in Congress, where legislators have exploited the FCC’s instability at the top and its partial 
detachment from the White House as bases for exerting more direct influence over it than over 
more traditional Executive Branch agencies. 
In all events, any reform of the FCC’s own processes could serve as no more than a first 
step in bringing greater regulatory determinacy to this industry. Equally in need of reform are the 
FCC’s relationships with other institutional players: with the courts that review the FCC’s policy 
choices and with the state commissions that implement those choices.  We address each of these 
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Relations With Reviewing Courts 
Any final order of the FCC is subject to judicial review in a federal court of appeals.
86 
The availability of such review contributes to the indeterminacy of telecommunications 
regulation, particularly when undertaken by activist generalist courts that consider themselves 
equally equipped as specialist agencies to understand the complexities of this industry.  
Under the doctrine of judicial deference formalized in Chevron U.S.A. v. National 
Resources Defense Council,
87 a reviewing court may not act as a policymaker in its own right. 
Instead, it may serve only as a backstop against agency action that is patently irrational, 
inconsistent with a clear statutory (or constitutional) mandate, or inadequately justified in the 
written document that accompanies the agency’s order.
88 A court that finds fault with an 
agency’s order is expected to remand the matter back to the agency itself for further deliberation 
within broad bounds.
89 Traditionally, the reason given for such deference is that agencies have 
greater topical expertise than judges and are subject to continuing congressional oversight as a 
check.
90 But an equally important rationale, particularly in the telecommunications field, is the 
value of regulatory determinacy.  
Every time a court invalidates an FCC rule, it injects uncertainty into the industry that 
may distort economically efficient behavior for many years. The problem with such judicial 
second-guessing, which has become quite common, is not just that it delays the ultimate 
resolution of important policy issues, but also that courts can misunderstand those issues or their 
industry context and thus adopt rules that, on close inspection, make little policy sense. One 
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recent example of this phenomenon was the Ninth Circuit’s stubborn reaffirmation in 2003 of its 
misinformed conclusion in 2000 that cable modem service contains a “telecommunications 
service” component and is presumptively subject to traditional common carrier regulation.
91 
Each such instance of judicial hubris can throw the industry into long periods of investment 
uncertainty, even when the FCC succeeds in persuading the resource-constrained Supreme Court 
to intervene.  
This is no way to run a major sector of the economy. If, alternatively, the courts stand 
down when faced with close questions about the lawfulness of agency decisions, the worst that 
can happen is that we as a society will get what we allow our politically accountable 
institutions—Congress and its administrative delegates—to give us. We are not suggesting that 
courts should play no role in reviewing the FCC’s decisions, despite this industry’s unique need 
for stable and predictable rules. Sometimes the FCC does act irrationally, as illustrated by its 
once differential regulatory treatment of “cellular” and “PCS” providers,
92 and sometimes it 
ignores clear statutory directives, as shown by its complete disregard in 1996 of the Act’s 
“impairment” standard for leasing network elements (discussed in Part I above).  Such misguided 
execution of delegated authority warrants judicial intervention.  Nonetheless, reviewing courts 
should pick their fights and remedies carefully, generally deferring to the FCC’s greater expertise 
and, just as important, to the industry’s need for regulatory predictability.  
 
Relations With The States 
By enacting the 1996 Act, Congress largely displaced the traditional model of dual 
jurisdiction, which divides the subject matter of telecommunications regulations into mutually 
exclusive federal and state spheres, with a new model of cooperative federalism in which the 
FCC and the states often work together in complementary roles on the same subject matter. For 
Congress, this new model was the only feasible choice for regulating telecommunications 
competition. The need to hammer out the innumerable details of carrier-to-carrier relations under 
the 1996 Act presents an immense bureaucratic challenge. Congress was not about to create a 
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series of FCC branch offices or increase the FCC’s staff many times over, and the state 
commissions provided a ready source of labor for the task at hand.
93  
Delegating such responsibility to the states, however, unavoidably gives each of them 
substantial discretion, as sovereign actors, in deciding how federal law will be implemented. This 
carries both benefits and costs. As one of us has argued, the states’ discretion in competition 
matters allows them to tailor regulatory approaches to local conditions, encourage public 
participation in the policymaking process, experiment with acceptable alternatives, and compete 
with one another to develop an optimal scheme of regulation.
94 As the other of us has noted, 
however, these benefits can come at a high cost, in the form of delay and confusion as well as 
massive lawyering and lobbying expenses.
95 The more complicated and multi-dimensional the 
regulatory scheme is, the more investment-chilling indeterminacy there will be about the rules of 
the road.  
The debates about state participation in telecommunications policy are only just 
beginning, as demonstrated by the incipient controversy over the states’ authority to regulate 
VoIP services. For as long as there is telecommunications regulation, there will be controversy 
about the proper role of the states in its implementation. Nonetheless, as the entire industry 
gradually coalesces around the Internet protocol, traditional state public utility regulation will 
quite likely succumb to two of the Internet’s most cherished characteristics:  its federally 
enforced freedom from state regulation and its tendency to efface political boundaries of all 
kinds.  Even under federal oversight, however, the states may still play a critical role in 
managing non-competition-related public policy priorities, such as ensuring 911 functionality in 
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Neutrality 
As seasoned observers are all too aware, the Commission often seems more adroit at 
jerry-rigging intellectually sloppy deals to appease industry factions in the short term than at 
making the analytically sound but politically difficult policy choices needed to promote long 
term economic efficiency.  Judge Richard Posner memorably described one FCC regulatory 
scheme (the so-called “finsyn rules”) as a set of “unprincipled compromises of Rube Goldberg 
complexity among contending interest groups viewed merely as clamoring suppliants who have 
somehow to be conciliated.”
96  Such dealmaking is particularly common in regulatory areas in 
which the FCC’s decisions have immediate and quantifiable effects on consumer bills or on the 
bottom lines of the regulated parties.  Like the line-sharing issue discussed in Part I, the FCC has 
demonstrated it chronic preference for short term patches over long term solutions in a number 
of areas, most notably with respect to the challenges of reforming its intercarrier compensation 
and universal service regimes.  
There is no straightforward institutional reform that would force the FCC to stand up to 
political pressures and chart a course of analytically rigorous neutrality. One obvious priority is 
to staff the FCC with principled leaders who have demonstrated as much of an appetite for 
getting policy answers right on the merits as for appeasing political constituencies. And, so long 
as the person on the top meets that description, vesting ultimate authority in one decisionmaker 
rather than five would, as discussed, reduce much of the horse-trading that not only delays 
resolution of important issues, but often compromises their analytical integrity when they are 
finally issued. 
Another impediment to the FCC’s neutrality comes from the formal arrangement of its 
staff into “bureaus” and “offices” corresponding to the obsolescent regulatory categories drawn 
by the Communications Act of 1934 and thus to arbitrarily defined industry segments. This 
organizational structure invites parochialism and occasionally outright protectionism. Spectrum 
policy reform, for example, is sometimes distorted by the differing perspectives of the Wireless 
Bureau, which takes special care to protect the incumbent cellular operators; the Office of 
Engineering and Technology, which looks after unlicensed uses; and the International Bureau, 
which oversees the spectrum used by satellite providers. A similarly arbitrary division of 
authority has also complicated the evolution of broadband policy. For example, the Wireline 
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Competition Bureau, which oversees the battles between incumbent telephone companies and 
their wireline competitors, tends to focus disproportionately on the significance of traditional 
wireline platforms offered by telephone companies, as those are the only ones it regulates. 
Replacing this legacy structure with a more horizontal regulatory orientation would alleviate 
these institutional concerns at the same time it resolves the more substantive broadband policy 
anomalies that result from the silo-based model that treats cable companies different from 
telephone companies even when they offer functionally similar services.  
 
Humility 
The FCC was created during the New Deal for two basic missions: micromanagement of 
the radio spectrum and traditional command-and-control regulation of telephone monopolies. As 
we have explained, technological developments and regulatory reforms have made each of those 
missions obsolete. The FCC must now respond by redefining its own role in an industry 
characterized by increasing competition and a commensurate decrease in the need for constant 
regulatory oversight.
97 To make that transition, the FCC must embrace the elusive virtue of 
regulatory humility.  
To repeat Alfred Kahn’s observation, the FCC’s basic challenge is to reorient its efforts 
towards “establishing the conditions under which competition may be relied on to determine the 
outcome” and away from policies “intended, whether consciously or unconsciously, to dictate 
that outcome.”
98 In practice, this means that, in an increasing number of regulatory areas, the 
FCC should focus more on back-end enforcement of basic competition norms, remedying only 
clear acts of anticompetitive conduct, instead of developing front-end prophylactic safeguards 
designed to anticipate all possible scenarios.
99 To be sure, at least for the foreseeable future, there 
are innumerable areas—such as interconnection, number portability, and intercarrier 
compensation—in which pre-set rules will be essential to industry stability. And the FCC thus 
will need to develop and superintend such rules for years to come. On the margins, however, as 
competition develops and relieves the need for comprehensively prescriptive regulation, the 
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Commission should embrace the more neutral, adjudicative approach of an enforcement agency 
like the FTC. 
This institutional reorientation will force the FCC to check its traditional instinct to “plan 
in advance of foreseeable events, instead of waiting to react to them.”
100 The basic problem with 
such preemptive regulation is that, as the history of regulation has shown, policymakers are often 
wrong both in their predictions of how the market will develop and in their judgments of what 
regulatory interventions will best promote consumer welfare.  Nowhere has such bureaucratic 
miscalculation harmed the public interest more than in the FCC’s assumption of the “wise man” 
role in dictating how the airwaves should be used. In contrast, the FCC’s legacy has been 
brighter when it has exercised the passive virtues while awaiting concrete evidence that the 
market actually needs regulatory intervention. For example, outgoing Chairman Michael Powell 
laudably confined himself to noting the mere prospect for “Net neutrality” rules in the event they 
ever become necessary rather than calling for the actual imposition of such rules before a clear 
need for them has been established. 
Of course, when particular economic conditions demonstrably lead to market failure, 
regulators should intervene sooner rather than later. Our point is that regulators should not 
blithely assume that a market will fail if it has not already done so, nor should they proceed on 
the assumption that, because they have regulatory authority, they should exercise it somehow or 
another. This is regulatory humility: knowing when one’s judgments as a policymaker cannot do 
better, and might do much worse, than the collective judgments of competing firms and millions 




In retrospect, it should not be surprising that an institution initially designed to regulate 
monopolies in perpetuity is poorly designed to intervene in the market just enough to promote 
competition and then, as appropriate, stand out of the way.
101  That new mission, however, is the 
FCC’s most important assignment.  The ultimate end game in telecommunications regulation—
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which, to be sure, will take many years to reach—should be a deregulatory environment in which 
market forces, rather than FCC officials, dictate the most productive uses of the radio spectrum, 
create cross-platform competition in the last mile, and devise efficient and sustainable 
intercarrier compensation and universal service regimes.  Of course, even in that world, 
regulators will play an important vestigial role in managing social welfare priorities such as 
universal service and 911 dialing, and they may well need to exercise some continuing oversight 
of basic interconnection arrangements.  For the most part, however, their role as prescriptive 
regulators of industry competition should slowly come to an end.  Facilitating that institutional 
transition ranks among Congress’s most important challenges as it considers fundamental 
changes to American telecommunications law. 
 